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Abstract
A peculiar principle of legal evidence in common law systems is that probative
evidence may be excluded in order to increase the accuracy of fact-finding. A
formal model is provided that rationalizes this principle. The key assumption
is that the fact-finders (jurors) have a cognitive cost of processing evidence, an
assumption well grounded in the psychological literature. Within this framework,
the judge excludes evidence in order to incentivize the jury to focus on other, more
probative evidence. Our analysis sheds light on two distinctive characteristics of
this type of exclusionary rules. First, that broad exclusionary powers are delegated
to the judge. Second, that exclusion by undue prejudice is peculiar to common law
systems. Both features arise in our model.
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Information Acquisition and the Exclusion of Evidence in
Trials
Abstract: A peculiar principle of legal evidence in common law systems is
that probative evidence may be excluded in order to increase the accuracy
of fact-finding. A formal model is provided that rationalizes this principle.
The key assumption is that the fact-finders (jurors) have a cognitive cost
of processing evidence, an assumption well grounded in the psychological
literature. Within this framework, the judge excludes evidence in order to
incentivize the jury to focus on other, more probative evidence. Our analy-
sis sheds light on two distinctive characteristics of this type of exclusionary
rules. First, that broad exclusionary powers are delegated to the judge. Sec-
ond, that exclusion by undue prejudice is peculiar to common law systems.
Both features arise in our model.
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1 Introduction
A peculiar principle of legal evidence in common law systems is that probative evidence
may be excluded in order to increase the accuracy of fact-finding. A formal model is
provided that rationalizes this principle. The key assumption is that the fact-finders
(jurors) have a cognitive cost of processing evidence, an assumption well grounded in
the psychological literature. Within this framework, the judge excludes evidence in
order to incentivize the jury to focus on other, more probative evidence. Our analysis
sheds light on two distinctive characteristics of this type of exclusionary rules. First,
that broad exclusionary powers are delegated to the judge. Second, that exclusion by
undue prejudice is peculiar to common law systems. Both features arise in our model.
A significant amount of recent literature in economic theory deals with endogenous
information acquisition in elections, committees, and juries. The premise of this litera-
ture is that agents (voters, jurors) must be incentivized to acquire information that is
socially valuable but costly to acquire. This literature then looks at the optimality of
the voting procedure in question in light of the information acquisition activity. In this
paper we extend this research agenda within the context of jury trials. We consider a
framework that is functionally identical to the information acquisition one–we posit
that jurors incur a cognitive cost when evaluating or information. We use this frame-
work to shed light on a hitherto neglected phase of the decision-making process–not
the voting rule, but rather the prior stage in which evidence is brought forward. This
stage of the decision-making process is governed by the rules of evidence, which form
a complex body of law.
An important subject matter of evidence law is the admissibility of evidence, i.e.,
what evidence can be shown to the jury and therefore influence the decision. In common
law trials, the judge pre-screens the evidence the jury will get to see. Clearly, what
evidence is deemed admissible has a large impact on the outcome of a trial. The jury
in a trial should, as a general rule, be presented with all relevant evidence. There are,
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however, exceptions to this rule. An important exception is based on the principle
that excluding probative evidence may increase the accuracy of fact-finding. In the
US system, this principle is referred to as exclusion on grounds of unfair prejudice.1
According to this principle, the judge is given wide discretion to exclude evidence that,
while probative, is seen as “unfairly” biasing the fact-finder (the jury). The principle
also underlies several other more specific exclusionary rules and powers.2 This principle
is remarkable for the latitude it aﬀords the judge to influence the outcome of the trial.
The principle that excluding probative evidence may increase the accuracy of fact-
finding is peculiar of common law systems,3 and it has received a great deal of scrutiny
over the centuries. Among the early economists who have addressed this exclusion-
ary principle is Jeremy Bentham, who thought that excluding evidence impaired jury
deliberation, and devoted a large part of his 1827 treatise to exposing what he per-
ceived as the drawbacks of exclusion of evidence (see Bentham 1827). More recently,
Gordon Tullock also took a dim view of this exclusionary principle.4 Yet, given its
long history,5 exclusion by reason of unfair prejudice should be presumed to play some
important functional role in common law systems.
The conventional justification is a paternalistic one: given certain kinds of evi-
1The fundamental principle underlying such exclusions is expressed in Rule 403 from the US Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, which states: “Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice [...] ”
2Such as the exclusion of character and prior acts, the power to bar expert witnesses from testifying
who are “hired guns,” as well as, perhaps, the rule against hearsay evidence.
3Damaska (1997, p. 15) remarks “Rules typical of common law can be found only among those that
reject probative information, on the belief that its elimination will enhance the accuracy of fact-finding.”
He calls such exclusionary rules “intrinsic.”
4“One would rather suspect that as the result of many of the laws of evidence (not all of them),
the [fact finder] is automatically somewhat erroneous as it simply ignores certain parts of the valid
evidence.” Cited from Tullock (1996), p. 7.
5Since the dawn of the common law system, the judge has had the power to exclude evidence.
Originally, that power was unremarkable because the judge was so dominant in the trial. From an
earlier system in which the trial judge himself collected evidence and examined the witnesses, while
attorneys played a limited role, the modern system evolved in which the judge plays a much less active
role. This evolution took place at the end of the 18th century, and it is then that the modern evidentiary
rules developed. (See Langbein (1996), p. 1201.) The Federal Rules of Evidence, which became law in
1975, mark the greatest retrenchment yet of judicial power over the trial. Still, the judge retains the
power to exclude evidence by reason of unfair prejudice.
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dence, juries make systematic mistakes in updating and so they need to be protected
from themselves. This paternalistic paradigm, while intuitively appealing, may not
necessarily be a productive way of conceptualizing (or justifying) exclusion. First, its
scope is diﬃcult to circumscribe: how would we know when productive updating stops
and “undue bias” begins? Second, and related, once we subscribe to the notion of
boundedly-rational or even irrational jurors, it becomes conceptually treacherous to
define notions of “more probative evidence,” and “more accurate decision;” what looks
more informative to the paternalistic observer might not be so to the irrational fact
finder, and vice versa. Third, it is not clear why the exclusionary rules in question
should not also have arisen in continental legal systems.
In this paper we articulate a model of “undue prejudice” which is not based on
mistaken updating on the part of the jury. The logic is very simple. In our model, jurors
can be fully rational, but they have a cognitive cost of processing information. The cost
captures the idea that some information is hard to understand. Jurors are assumed to
(consciously or subconsciously) optimize their mental eﬀort in processing information —
they behave as “cognitive misers.”6 Thus, jurors may focus on information that is easy
to understand, though not necessarily very probative, instead of evaluating information
that is very probative but hard to understand. In this framework, excluding easy-to-
understand information can provide the proper incentives for the jury to focus on more
probative information, thus improving the quality of the decision.
We view this model as oﬀering a fairly conventional formalization of “undue preju-
dice.” In the model, jurors have a tendency to ignore evidence and pre-judge based on
their prior beliefs — hence they are “pre-judiced.”7 Excluding evidence may help induce
jurors to focus on better evidence and thus to rely less on their prior beliefs — it makes
them less “pre-judiced.” Within this framework, the notion of “undue” prejudice can
6 In Section 6 we provide evidence from the psychology literature suggesting that people are conscious
of the mental eﬀort needed to analyze evidence and that they act so as to reduce it.
7The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language describes prejudice as : “[A] judgment
or opinion formed beforehand or without knowledge or examination of the facts.”
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be coherently articulated and distinguished from appropriate (in a statistical sense)
reliance on the juror’s prior beliefs. The juror shows “undue” prejudice if he does
not process a piece of available information due to his cognitive costs. The resulting
over-reliance on the prior is properly viewed as “undue” because a benevolent social
planner, conscious of the large positive externalities of a correct decision, would greatly
discount (in the limit, ignore) the cognitive costs incurred by the jury and command
the jury to evaluate that piece of evidence. In this account, the judge who excludes
evidence is not behaving paternalistically. Rather, he is employing the (limited) means
at his disposal to induce the jury to exert more eﬀort. In this respect, the problem is
analogous to a principal-agent relationship in an economic setting.
We study the comparative statics properties of this model, and demonstrate some
fairly counterintuitive properties. For example, making evidence more probative may
lead it to be optimally excluded. Similarly, a judge may optimally choose to exclude
more evidence when faced with a more competent jury. Finally, we show that the
decision to exclude evidence is a contextual one: optimal exclusion of one piece of ev-
idence requires taking into account its relationship with all other pieces of evidence.
We interpret these complex and counterintuitive properties as evidence that general
rules mandating exclusion are unlikely to be optimal. In our model, rather, optimal
exclusion can be implemented straightforwardly by giving the judge broad exclusion-
ary powers. In this sense, our analysis finds virtues in the broad latitude currently
aﬀorded the judge. Finally, the analysis suggests a reason why exclusion by reason of
unfair prejudice is characteristic of common-law systems. This is because common law
systems are adversarial; we shall develop this argument later in the paper, after we
have introduced some key concepts.8
The aim of this paper is certainly not to contend that juries are perfectly rational
in their updating.9 Indeed, our theory can properly be viewed as a model of bounded
8See Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) for a historical perspective on the divergence between common law
and continental trials.
9 Indeed, in our analysis jurors may, or may not, update in a Bayesian fashion. There is much
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rationality. Rather, by proposing a model based on optimizing agents, we challenge the
notion that irrationality is required to justify exclusionary rules. A conceptualization
based on the juror as a “cognitive miser” has several advantages. From an empirical
viewpoint, there is strong support in the psychology literature for the hypothesis that
people incur mental eﬀort in evaluating evidence.10 From a model-building viewpoint,
it is less arbitrary to introduce costs of evaluating evidence than to build a brand-
new model of updating. And, because of the minimal departure from the standard
decision-theoretic models, we can still make conceptual sense of notions such as “better
information,” and “more accurate decision,” and our results are directly comparable
with those from standard decision theory.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the economic literature on information acquisition. In particu-
lar, we share in common a focus on identifying the proper incentives for an agent, or a
group of agents, to acquire costly information. The existing literature analyzes optimal
information acquisition when information is aggregated through voting (e.g., Gersbach
1995, Mukhopadhaya 2003, Persico 2004, Feddersen and Sandroni 2006, Martinelli
2006, 2007, Gerardi and Yariv 2008a, and Gershkov and Szentes 2008); information
acquisition in bureaucratic settings (Stephenson 2007); and the optimal transmission
of information from “experts”to less informed principals (Gerardi and Yariv 2008b).
Borgers et al. (2007) study the valuation of multiple pieces of information in a setting
with costly information acquisition. Overall, the techniques used in this literature are
quite close to those utilized here, even though our focus is not exclusively on Bayesian
updating. None of these papers, however, address the specific institution or mechanism
discussed in this paper.
Our paper is also related to the large legal literature inquiring about the rationale
evidence that they are not always rational.
10See Section 6.
7
for “intrinsic” exclusionary rules (using the terminology of Damaska 1997). Sanchirico
(2001), in dealing specifically with exclusion of character evidence, provides a useful
classification of such rationales. Rationales supporting the exclusion of evidence can
be classified into two categories, based on the interest that exclusion is assumed to
promote.
The first category of rationales are based on an incentive argument: by exclud-
ing evidence, the legislator might seek to provide incentives for potential wrongdoers.
Thus, an extreme rendition of the argument goes, incentives ought to be conditioned
preferably on signals that the wrongdoer can aﬀect by his actions; all other evidence
(character evidence, in particular) should not be used to provide incentives. This clever
argument, proposed by Sanchirico (2001),11 seems best suited to explain rules thatman-
date exclusion. That is because the argument relies on the predictability of exclusion
on the part of the potential wrongdoer. A salient feature of Rule 403 in the US Federal
Rules of Evidence, in contrast, is the latitude given the judge to exclude evidence on a
case by case basis. That latitude seems to run counter the incentive-giving argument,
because it makes it diﬃcult for the potential wrongdoer to foresee what evidence might
be excluded. Our theory, as we will show, is consistent with this latitude. There-
fore, we view Sanchirico (2001) as providing a rationale for mandatory exclusionary
rules, while our theory can explain discretionary exclusion. Our contribution is thus
complementary, not substitute, to Sanchirico (2001).
The second category of argument is based on the view that the legislator seeks to
improve the quality (accuracy) of the outcome of the trial. This is the more conventional
view, and it is the one that is taken in this paper. The challenge, of course, is to explain
how excluding evidence can improve the quality of the decision. Some authors simply
did not believe it could. Other authors find a role for exclusion of evidence. Some
authors believe that evidence of past crimes, for example, might tempt the jury into
punishing the past crime as opposed to the (alleged) present one. Other authors appeal
11Schrag and Scotchmer (1994) provide a related argument.
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vaguely to a tendency to be overly, or unduly, aﬀected by certain kind of evidence.
These arguments are similar in that they focus on some “undue bias,” which may arise
either because the juror’s goals might be swayed by the presentation of certain kind
of evidence, or because jurors might update incorrectly. By comparison, we view our
approach as a small and well-defined departure from the fully rational model with
zero cost of processing information. One advantage of being able to stick close to
the rational model is that the structure provided by the rationality hypothesis aﬀords
some comparative statics implications, which would be diﬃcult to obtain (or be rather
arbitrary) if one departs from the rational model.
2 The Benefits of Exclusion: An Example
In this section, we introduce a simple example to illustrate how a judge’s ability to
exclude evidence can be welfare-improving. Suppose that a juror is asked to decide
whether the speed of a car that was involved in an accident exceeded 50 miles per hour.
Let x denote the speed of the car, which in the juror’s mind is equally likely to be any
real number between 0 and 100 miles per hour. Formally, we think of x as a random
variable that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 100]. If the juror rules correctly,
he receives a payoﬀ of 0, and if he rules incorrectly, he receives a payoﬀ of −100. There
are two pieces of evidence available, but each is costly to process. The first piece of
evidence, which we denote E1, has a cost of 5 and informs the juror whether or not x
is in the interval [0, 20]. The second piece of evidence, E2, has a cost of 35 and informs
the juror whether or not x is in the interval [10, 50].
E1 is less valuable information than E2 on average. Observing the realization of E1
and learning whether the car was driving below 20 miles per hour provides relatively
little information about whether the car was driving below 50 miles per hour. Indeed,
after learning that the driver’s speed did not lie in the interval [0, 20], the probability
that the driver’s speed was less than 50miles per hour, 38 , is still relatively large. On the
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other hand, observing the realization of E2 and learning whether the car was driving
between 10 and 50 miles per hour provides a lot of information about whether the car
was driving below 50 miles per hour; after learning that the driver’s speed did not lie
in the interval [10, 50], the probability that the driver’s speed was less than 50 miles
per hour is reduced to 16 . Finally, note that observing the realization of both pieces of
evidence will allow the juror to know with certainty if the speed exceeded 50.
The table below illustrates the payoﬀs to both the juror and society when the juror
chooses to process just the first piece of evidence, just the second, both, and neither.12
We assume that the cognitive costs of processing information incurred by the jurors are
negligible to society.13
Table 1: Payoﬀs to Juror and Society
Juror Society
Process Expected Payoﬀ Process Expected Payoﬀ
E1 -35 E1 -30
E2 -45 E2 -10
E1, E2 -40 E1, E2 0
Neither -50 Neither -50
Clearly, then, the optimal outcome for society is for the juror to process both pieces
of evidence. However, the juror would choose to only process E1, as the gains from a
more accurate ruling associated with E2 are outweighed by the costs of processing.
The same point is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Evaluating E1, E2 is socially
ideal, but consideration of the private costs will lead the juror to evaluate only E1
instead. To prevent this outcome, which is socially undesirable, the judge can exclude
E1 (thereby also excluding the package E1, E2) and the juror will choose to process E2.
Though this outcome is second best, the payoﬀ to society clearly dominates the payoﬀ
12An explanation of how these values were derived is provided in the appendix.
13One justification for this assumption is that the direct benefits of a correct ruling on the lives of
those involved in court cases, as well as the indirect benefits of maintaining a fair, trustworthy legal
system, far outweigh the cognitive costs of a few selected jurors.
10
in the absence of exclusion.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
3 Model
We assume, for simplicity, that the jury is composed of only one juror.14 Let θ be a
random variable denoting the true state of the world. The realization of this random
variable is what needs to be determined, but it is unknown to both the judge and the
juror. There is a set of random variables S ≡ {E1, E2, ..., En} that are correlated with
θ. We will refer to these variables as pieces of evidence, and to any subset of it as
an information set. The information system S represents all the evidence that could
conceivably be presented to the juror.
The juror, but not the judge, has the ability to evaluate the evidence, which means
that the juror can extract the information contained in the evidence. We think of the
evaluation process as analogous to opening a box and observing the realization ei of
the piece of evidence Ei. Opening the box entails a cost, associated with the cognitive
process of evaluating a piece of evidence and using the information to update beliefs.
For example, evaluating the accounting evidence presented in a complex financial fraud
case, and drawing implications concerning the guilt of the defendant, can be mentally
quite taxing for the jury. After the evidence is evaluated, it may turn out that the
evidence exonerates the defendant or that it incriminates him, or that the evidence
is not relevant. The “box opening” metaphor captures this costly evaluation process.
We also assume that, before going through the evaluation process, the jury and the
judge have a sense of the probative value contained on average in the piece of evidence;
formally, the probability distribution over realizations of Ei, conditional on θ, is known
to all. That is, the judge and the jury can foresee the expected benefits of delving into
the accounting evidence. This may, for example, lead the jury to rationally “tune oﬀ”
14This assumption is relaxed in Section 6.1.
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the accounting evidence, and to rely instead on other evidence which may be cognitively
easier to process (evidence of the defendant’s wealth, for example).
Not all pieces of evidence need to be presented to the juror, nor is the juror obliged
to evaluate every piece of available evidence. At the judge’s discretion, the juror may
be presented with any subset S ⊆ S of all the possible evidence. The juror, in turn,
may choose to restrict attention to any subset s ⊆ S of the evidence that is presented to
her; for example, the juror may choose not to evaluate any piece of evidence, in which
case s = ∅, or the juror may choose to evaluate only the first two pieces of evidence,
in which case s ={E1, E2}.
If the juror evaluates a subset s of the evidence presented to her, she receives an
expected payoﬀ
V (s)− C (s) .
The function C (s) represents the cost the juror incurs from evaluating the information
set s. The function V (·) represents the expected benefit to the juror from adjudicating
the case. We shall assume that V is monotonic in the sense that
V (s) < V
¡
s0
¢
if s ⊂ s0.
This implies that every piece of evidence is valuable, in that it helps increase the
accuracy of the decision.
3.1 Social Welfare and the Problem of the Judge
We stipulate that the expected value to society from adjudicating the case based on
consideration of information set s is given by V (s) . This amounts to assuming that C,
the juror’s disutility from processing information, is negligible to society relative to the
benefit of reaching the correct decision. Because V is monotonic, the maximum value
of V is achieved when all information is utilized by the juror. The juror, in contrast,
does not necessarily want V to be maximal because her objective function also involves
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C. Thus, the juror does not generally have the socially proper incentives to process all
available information, and an agency problem arises.
The judge, whose utility coincides with society’s, simply wants V to be maximal.
The divergence of interests between the juror and the judge (or society) leaves room
for socially beneficial intervention on the part of the judge. We assume that the act of
evaluating evidence is not contractible, so the juror cannot be compensated based on
the evidence she might choose to evaluate. Such, of course, is the case in real-world
courts. The only instrument that the judge may use to intervene in the adjudication
process is the exclusion of evidence. By restricting the set of evidence presented to the
juror, the judge may induce the juror to evaluate more probative evidence.
In our model, the judge chooses the subset of evidence S to present to the juror so
as to maximize the probative value of the evidence evaluated by the juror. The judge
cannot, or at lepast does not, perform the task of evaluating evidence before deciding
on exclusion.15 Formally, the judge’s problem is
max
S
V (s∗)
s.t. s∗ ∈ argmax
s⊆S
V (s)− C (s) .
3.2 Special Case: A Bayesian Juror.
The model developed above is not necessarily tied to the assumptions of Bayesian
updating. Instead, it operates at a more abstract level by taking as primitive the
function V, which may or may not derive from Bayesian updating. In the special case
of Bayesian updating, the function V (s) would represent the expected gains from a
correct ruling, conditional on the information contained in s, less the expected losses
from type one and type two errors. In this framework, evaluating evidence means
observing the realization ei of Ei16 and updating the probability distribution over θ
15 In our model, this role is reserved for the jury. This assumption embodies the common-law principle
that fact-finding is for the jury, and the judge is supposed to act as a referee.
16We assume that n, the joint distribution of θ and E1, ..., En, as well as the cognitive costs, are
common knowledge to the judge and juror. This assumption allows us to avoid the possibility that a
13
according to Bayes’ rule.17. After choosing a subset of evidence s to process, and
observing the realized value of each piece of evidence in this subset, a juror must make
a decision, d (conviction or acquittal, for example). The decision gives rise to a payoﬀ
which depends on the true state of the world via a loss function L (d, θ) . For example,
the juror may feel a loss of zero if the decision is correct (acquit the innocent, convict
the guilty) and experience a negative payoﬀ if the decision is incorrect. The expected
loss of a juror who makes a decision upon observing e ≡ {ei : Ei ∈ s}, a specific
realization of s, is
v(e) = max
d
E [L (d, θ) |e] ,
where the letter E represents the (conditional) expectation operator applied to θ. The
function V in our model is the expected loss ex ante, before observing the realization
e. Thus, in this case the function V is given by
V (s) = E [v(e)] .
Of course, V (s) < V (s0) if s ⊂ s0, because a Bayesian decision maker can make a better
decision when he has more information.
4 The Absence of General Principles Guiding Exclusion
In this section we present several results pointing to the diﬃculty of eliciting general
principles that can inform the exclusion of specific pieces of evidence as a general rule.
One source of this diﬃculty is that optimal exclusion is necessarily conditional on the
juror would update his beliefs based on what evidence is not presented. In our model, excluding Ei is
equivalent to admitting it but with a very high cost ci.
17 It is worth emphasizing that we do not restrict pieces of evidence to be conditionally independent.
In the literature that attempts to model juror judgment and decision making, the label “Bayesian
updating” is sometimes equated with Bayesian updating for the special case where all evidence is
conditionally independent (see e.g. Hastie 1993). In this case, all information is captured in the
conditional likelihood functions. In other words, this restrictive interpretation of Bayesian jurors rules
out any more elaborate interdependence of evidence, e.g. complementarity and substitutability of
evidence. We argue, to the contrary, that interdependencies of evidence are important, and illustrate
it for the case of the costs and benefits of exclusion.
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totality of the evidence at one’s disposal. To see this, note that if S = {E1} is a sin-
gleton, then E1 should always be admitted, regardless of its informational content or
cognitive costs. But if exclusion leads some other piece of evidence to be evaluated,
as in the initial example, then it may be optimal to exclude E1. Hence the key point:
excluding a piece of evidence (E1 in our case) may be beneficial or detrimental, depend-
ing on the characteristics of other available pieces of evidence. In theory, therefore, a
general rule which attempted to mandate optimal exclusion will need to condition the
exclusionary rules on the fine details of the other evidence available in the case.
The fact that optimal exclusion is conditional is not the only reason why general
principles concerning exclusion are diﬃcult to come by. In the remainder of this section
we show that optimal exclusion can have some counterintuitive properties. We inter-
pret these findings as suggestive that it is diﬃcult, within our model, to give general
prescriptions about what evidence ought to be excluded. We take these cautionary
results as supportive of the practice of delegating to the judge a broad authority to
exclude evidence.
4.1 The Informational Content of Evidence, Outcomes, and Exclusion
First, we will use an example to illustrate that improving the accuracy of evidence
may lead to a worse decision. We heed strictly to the fully rational, Bayesian updating
framework; the V functions in the examples are derived from Bayesian decision making,
and the cost function is actually additive (a special case of submodularity). Given the
purpose of the (counter)examples, the fact that they obtain in a very conventional
environment should help convince the reader that they are a robust feature in this
framework.
Consider the example described in Section 2, in which the juror must rule on whether
the speed of a car, which we denote x, was greater or less than 50 miles per hour. Let
us maintain all previous assumptions on the distribution of x, the juror’s payoﬀs, and
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the properties of E2. First, consider evidence EA1 , which has cost c
A
1 = 5 and reveals
whether x lies in the interval [0, 10] or whether it lies in the interval (10, 100]. The
payoﬀs to the juror and society are characterized in the Table 2 below.
Table 2: Payoﬀs to Juror and Society
Juror Society
Process Expected Payoﬀ Process Expected Payoﬀ
E1 -45 E1 -45
E2 -45 E2 -10
E1, E2 -40 E1, E2 0
Neither -50 Neither -50
Under this information system, the juror chooses to process both EA1 and E2 when
both pieces of evidence are available. In words, EA1 is suﬃciently uninformative that
the juror seeks out additional information in the form of E2. Note that the outcome is
the first best.
Let us now replace evidence EA1 with evidence E
B
1 , which also has cost c
B
1 = 5,
but reveals whether x lies in the interval [0, 10], (10, 20], or (20, 100]. Notice two
characteristics of EB1 . First, for this decision problem, it is equivalent to evidence E1
in the original example in Section 2. Therefore, the juror’s optimal decision is the
same as in Section 2: EB1 is suﬃciently informative that the juror does not find it
optimal to process E2, given its cost. As a result, the juror only processes EB1 and
the payoﬀ to society is strictly lower than the payoﬀ under the information system
EA1 , E2. Secondly, note that E
B
1 is more informative than E
A
1 in the sense of Blackwell
(1951): it is more valuable in any decision problem. Therefore, we conclude that more
informative evidence may lead to worse outcomes in the absence of exclusion.
Result 1. Absent exclusion, more informative evidence (in the sense of Blackwell) can
lead to worse outcomes.
A counterintuitive corollary (or re-interpretation) of this result is that finding jurors
16
who are better able to evaluate evidence is not necessarily desirable from a social
viewpoint. Such jurors may rely on a smaller subset of evidence (EB1 in the example
above), while less able jurors, aware of their limitations, will continue to seek out
additional information (both EA1 and E2) before reaching a decision.
Corollary 1. A jury that has the ability to interpret evidence more accurately (in the
sense of Blackwell) may make less accurate decisions.
Note that these counterintuitive results cannot be eliminated by optimal exclusion.
Returning to the previous example, a judge may want to allow a certain piece of evidence
(i.e. EA1 ) and yet, caeteris paribus, the judge may want to exclude a more informative
version of the same piece of evidence (i.e. EB1 ). Indeed, in the example the first best
outcome was achieved under information system (EA1 , E2), since the juror’s optimal
choice implied the maximal payoﬀ to society, zero. However, once EA1 is replaced with
more informative evidence, the judge optimally excludes EB1 and the payoﬀ is reduced
to −10. This shows that even with optimal exclusion, better evidence may lead to worse
outcomes.
Proposition 1. (Quality of evidence and exclusion) Improving the probative
value of a piece of evidence (in the sense of Blackwell) may lead that piece of evidence
to be optimally excluded. Even with exclusion, more informative evidence can lead to
worse outcomes.
The corollary below again translates our finding to speak about the jury’s level of
ability. A judge facing a jury who is capable of a more accurate reading of the evidence
(EB1 instead of E
A
1 ) may be lead to exclude the first piece of evidence (E
B
1 ).
Corollary 2. A “better” jury (one that has the ability to interpret evidence more
accurately in the sense of Blackwell) may lead the judge to optimally exclude more
evidence.
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This result, while counterintuitive, is also insightful in that it makes clear that,
within our model, the judge excludes evidence not to protect the jury from evidence
that it is unfit to process, but rather to provide incentives for the jury to seek out more
informative evidence.18
In conclusion, since excluding evidence is as much about the evidence that is admit-
ted as about the evidence that is not, even the most basic properties we would expect
can fail to be true. As such, general principles guiding optimal exclusion are diﬃcult
to identify. Fortunately, a judge is available in our setup who can be trusted with the
power to optimally exclude evidence on a case-by-case basis. It seems natural in this
setup that there will be few rules mandating exclusion, and that broad exclusionary
powers would be delegated to the judge. We therefore interpret our negative results as
making the case for delegating to the judge a broad authority to exclude evidence.
5 Complementary and Substitutable Evidence
As illustrated above, the decision to exclude a piece of evidence relies heavily on how it
relates to other pieces of evidence. In this section, we formalize the notions of comple-
mentary and substitutable pieces of evidence, and pursue exclusionary principles that
might be based on these notions. Intuitively, two pieces of evidence are complementary
if possessing one makes it more desirable for the jury to acquire the other. We will
show that if all pieces of evidence in an information system are complementary, then
excluding any subset of them cannot improve the quality of the decision. We then go
on to suggest that in an adversarial system it is unlikely that the entire information
system in a trial is complementary. Rather, it is more likely that the information sets
put forth by the two parties — plaintiﬀ and defendant — will contain substitutable pieces
of evidence, even though the pieces of evidence presented by a single party may well
be complementary among themselves. We then introduce a notion of complementarity
18We expand upon this example in the appendix to provide further insights into the intuition behind
our results.
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“within information sets,” one which does not extend to the whole information system.
Elements of an information sets that are complementary with each other we call stories.
We then show another negative result, namely, that the judge does not necessarily want
to admit evidence that complements a story.
5.1 Definitions
The mathematical notion of complementarity is related to the legal notion of “condi-
tional relevance.” This notion enters the decision of what pieces of evidence are to be
considered relevant, and so may be admitted to trial. When the probative value of a
piece of evidence is positively dependent on the presence of another piece of evidence,
the judge needs to weigh the joint probative value of the two pieces of evidence.19
A formal definition of complementary information is based on the notion of super-
modularity.
Definition 1. A function f is said to be supermodular if, for any two information
sets s1, s2,
f (s1 ∪ s2) + f (s1 ∩ s2) ≥ f (s1) + f (s2) .
We say that a function f is submodular if −f is supermodular.
Definition 2. An information system is complementary if the associated value func-
tion V is supermodular. In that case the separate pieces of evidence E1, ...En of the
information system are said to be complementary to each other. If V is submodular
then the pieces of evidence are called substitutes.
To illustrate the meaning of complementarity in our context, let s1 = E1, ...En−1
and s2 = En in the equation above. Rearranging terms yields
V (E1, ...En)− V (E1, ...En−1) ≥ V (En)− V (∅) .
19Rule 104(b) provides that "(w)hen the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence suﬃcient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
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In words, information piece En is more valuable — that is, it leads to a greater increase in
the value function — when it is paired with the set E1, ...En−1 than when it is considered
in isolation. When the value function is supermodular, each piece of information is most
valuable when considered in the context of other information.
For an example of complementary pieces of evidence, suppose the question to be
adjudicated is whether a US citizen defendant is or is not a member of the Yakuza, the
Japanese mafia. It is known that many Yakuza members are missing a pinky finger,
owing to their custom of severing it as a self-imposed penalty for unsatisfactory conduct
with regards to the criminal organization. Now consider the following two pieces of
evidence: ethnicity, and whether a pinky finger is missing. Each piece of evidence on
its own has almost no probative value of membership in the criminal organization–
the great majority of Japanese-Americans do not belong to the Yakuza, and the great
majority of US citizens with missing fingers are presumably unlucky carpenters. Yet
the two pieces of evidence together represent somewhat probative evidence. Thus, the
two pieces of evidence are complements.
For an example of substitute pieces of evidence, suppose the question to be adju-
dicated is whether the defendant committed a particular crime that occurred in New
York City. There are two pieces of evidence. One is computer records from a toll booth
indicating that the defendant’s car entered New York City. The other is a parking
violation incurred on the streets of New York City. Either piece of information may
be quite informative about the whereabouts of the defendant on the day in question.
However, knowing one decreases the jury’s value of knowing the other.
When the function V is derived from a Bayesian decision problem, whether or
not an information system E1, ...En is complementary depends not only on their joint
distribution conditional on θ, but also on the prior over θ and on the loss function,
all of which enter the expression for V. For instance, two pieces of evidence may be
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complementary for a certain prior over θ and substitute for another prior.20
Definition 3. The cost function C is said to have nondecreasing returns to scale if C
is submodular.
The assumption of nondecreasing returns implies that the “marginal” cost of eval-
uating a piece of evidence decreases when other pieces of evidence are also considered.
This is a property of returns to scale in the evaluation of costly evidence. A special
case of submodularity is additivity, the case in which for every disjoint s1 and s2 we
have C (s1 ∪ s2) = C (s1)+C (s2) . In the additive case the marginal cost of evaluating
evidence is independent of the amount of other evidence being evaluated.
5.2 Exclusion and Complementary Evidence
In the introduction, we showed how excluding a piece of evidence can be welfare-
improving. By removing cheaper, less informative evidence, the judge manipulated
the juror’s choice set so that more informative evidence was processed, and a better
decision (on average) was handed down. We now describe circumstances in which
excluding evidence can not be beneficial.
Assumption 1. If the jury is indiﬀerent among processing several information sets,
the jury will choose the one that is most informative (i.e., the one with the highest
social welfare).
This assumption is weak in that it only restricts the choices made when the jury is
indiﬀerent among several subsets of evidence. We should expect this occurrence to be
very unlikely, in the sense that it does not occur in a generic set of primitives.21
Proposition 2. If the information system is complementary, the cost function exhibits
nondecreasing returns to scale, and Assumption 1 holds, then excluding information
cannot improve the quality of the decision.
20Persico (2005) provides an example of this phenomenon in the context of a jury model.
21An alternative to Assumption 1 that yields equivalent results is to assume independence of irrelevant
alternatives.
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Proof. We will prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that all pieces of evidence
in information system S are complementary, and let s∗ ⊆ S denote the subset of
information that the juror chooses to process when all pieces of evidence in S are
allowed. Let sˆ denote the juror’s choice when only pieces of evidence in the set SA ⊂ S
are admitted. Due to our assumptions of complementarity and returns to scale, the
function f(·) = V (·)− C(·) is supermodular. Then the following holds:
f(sˆ ∪ s∗)− f(s∗) ≥ f(sˆ)− f(sˆ ∩ s∗) ≥ 0, (1)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that sˆ is the jury’s choice within the set
SA, which contains sˆ∩s∗. It follows from equation (1) that it must be f(sˆ∪s∗) ≥ f(s∗).
Strict inequality cannot hold, by definition of s∗, so that it must be
f(sˆ ∪ s∗) = f(s∗). (2)
This shows that the jury must be indiﬀerent between processing sˆ∪s∗ and s∗. Suppose,
towards a contradiction, that sˆ were strictly more informative than s∗. Then sˆ ∪ s∗ is
also strictly more informative than s∗. By Assumption 1, then, the jury could not have
chosen to process s∗ when all pieces of evidence S are allowed. This establishes the
required contradiction. ¥
The relevance of this result, of course, depends on the likelihood that the entire
information system is complementary. In adversarial systems, these circumstances
would seem unlikely. Though each side (plaintiﬀ and defendant) may present a subset
of evidence composed of complementary pieces of evidence — what one might call an
argument or story — in general the pieces of evidence within one party’s argument may
very well be substitutes in relation to the opposition’s argument. We formalize these
ideas, and show that general results regarding the optimal use of exclusion are hard to
come by in this context. Again, we interpret this dearth of general prescriptions as an
aﬃrmative argument for delegating the unfettered exercise of exclusionary powers to
the judge.
22
5.3 Complementarity of Evidence in an Adversarial System
When an information system is complementary, there is no role for exclusion. However,
in an adversarial system, it may be unlikely that all available pieces of evidence are
complementary. In such a system, the plaintiﬀ and defendant each gather and present
separate evidence to tell their own “story.” Presumably, each party hopes that the jury
will listen to their story and disregard their opponent’s; in our language, it is likely
that pieces of one story are substitutes for pieces of the other.
Again, an example may be helpful. Consider the case of a crime committed in a
particular neighborhood of New York City. The prosecution might present a parking
violation incurred by the defendant in that neighborhood, along with other potentially
damning evidence, to develop a story to suggest the defendant’s guilt. The defense may
present evidence that the defendant visited a family member living in that neighbor-
hood, in conjunction with other potentially exculpatory evidence, to develop a story to
suggest the defendant’s innocence. These two pieces of evidence would be substitutes
— they both establish the defendant’s presence in the neighborhood in question — but
they are part of opposing stories.
The question, then, is whether Proposition 2 can be extended to a setup in which
the entire information system is not necessarily complementary. The answer is negative:
we show that when the information system is made up of two competing stories, it may
be optimal to exclude parts of a story. So, the fact that pieces of evidence in a story
are complements does not guarantee that it is necessarily optimal for all pieces to be
admitted. Put diﬀerently, the fact that a piece of information is complementary to a
story which gets told at the trial does not necessarily guarantee that it is optimal to
admit that piece.
To make our point formally, we need to define what we mean by “story.” Intuitively,
a story is a collection of pieces of evidence which are all complementary with each other.
The formal definition follows.
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Definition 4. A subset S of an information system S is said to be a story if, for all
a1,a2 ⊂ S and b ⊂ SÂS,
V ((a1 ∪ a2) ∪ b) + V ((a1 ∩ a2) ∪ b) ≥ V (a1 ∪ b) + V (a2 ∪ b) .
According to this definition, a story S is composed of pieces of evidence which are
all complements with each other regardless of what evidence b may exist outside of S.
Proposition 3. It may be optimal to exclude part of a story.
Proof. We will show that the property holds in an example with a Bayesian decision
maker. Consider a Bayesian decision problem in which the unknown θ can take one of
two values, guilty or innocent, with equal probability. The action is binary: convict
or acquit. The loss function is equal to -1 if convicting the innocent or acquitting
the guilty and 1 otherwise, so that V (∅) = 0. Let the plaintiﬀ’s story be a singleton
SP = {E1}, and let the defendant’s story be composed of two complementary pieces
of evidence, SD = {E2, E3}. Suppose for simplicity that the cost function is additive,
with C (E2) = C (E3) = 0. C (E1) will be determined below.
Suppose E1 and (E2, E3) are substitutes, and that neither story is perfectly infor-
mative, so that
1 > V (E1) ≥ V (E1, E2, E3)− V (E2, E3) ≡  ≥ 0. (3)
Moreover, suppose that processing of the bundle (E1, E3) is socially preferred to the
bundle (E2, E3), though neither bundle is perfectly informative, so that
1 > V (E1, E3)− V (E2, E3) ≡ δ > 0. (4)
Finally, suppose that E3 has very little probative value, while E1 is very informative,
so that
V (E1, E3)− V (E3) = 1− η (5)
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for some 0 ≤ η < 1−max{, δ}. Then for any max{, δ} < C(E1) < 1−η, the following
inequalities are true:
V (E2, E3) > V (E1, E2, E3)− C(E1) (6)
V (E2, E3) > V (E1, E3)− C(E1) (7)
V (E1, E3)− C(E1) > V (E3). (8)
These three inequalities imply, respectively, that (i) C(E1) is suﬃciently large that the
juror would not choose to process all three pieces of evidence, (ii) C(E1) is suﬃciently
large that the juror prefers (E2, E3) to (E1, E3), and (iii) C(E1) is suﬃciently small
that the juror prefers to (E1, E3) to just E1. Given our assumption that V (E1, E3) >
V (E2, E3), it follows immediately that the judge would optimally exclude E2, even
though it is complementary to E3. ¥
6 Discussion of Modeling Assumptions
In this section, we discuss several of our modeling assumptions. The first discussion
is technical; we establish conditions under which our analysis of a single-juror model
would extend to a multi-juror setup. The second discussion is practical; we present a
variety of evidence from research in cognitive psychology, behavioral decision-making,
and even psychophysiology to support our assumptions behind the cognitive costs of
processing information and the strategic behavior of jurors in selecting which evidence
to process.
6.1 Multiple Jurors
In the benchmark model, we assumed that there is only a single fact-finder. This
was done mainly for expositional ease. We now establish conditions under which the
analysis carried out in the previous sections applies verbatim to juries of any size. To
that end, suppose that there are J > 1 jurors that are homogeneous with respect to
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their preferences, their ability to process information, and the manner in which they
update beliefs. Let us assume further that, once the eﬀort of evaluating the significance
of a piece of evidence has been incurred, a juror can communicate his conclusions to the
other jurors immediately and at zero cost. Finally, let us assume that the cost function
is additive.
Since jurors have common values, they will want to share fully the outcome of what-
ever evidence they have evaluated, and therefore all jurors will have the same beliefs
after information has been shared. Moreover, since jurors have identical preferences
and beliefs, they will naturally agree on the optimal decision. Operatively, this means
that if s represents the evidence collectively evaluated by all members of the jury, then
all jurors share the same function V (s) .
It remains to be determined, however, who among the jurors is responsible for eval-
uating the various pieces of evidence. In this respect jurors face a free-riding problem,
since each juror would rather that someone else evaluate the information and report
the outcome to all. However, consider the strategy of a single juror when considering
whether or not to evaluate a piece of evidence En, taking as given the subset s of ev-
idence being processed by other jurors. The private benefit of evaluating En is given
by
V (s ∪En)− V (s)
and the private cost is given by C (En) . In this sense, the “marginal” conditions that
dictate whether a juror evaluates En in a multi-juror model are identical to those condi-
tions in a single-juror model. Consequently, if it is optimal to acquire the configuration
s∗ in the single-juror setup, then s∗ is also a Nash equilibrium in the multi-juror case22
Note that this observation is silent on how cognitive costs will be distributed across
the jurors. This distributional question is immaterial because we have assumed that the
cost function is linear. It is possible, in particular, that all the evaluating is performed
22The absence of any possibility of payments (in kind or otherwise) for eﬀort expended among the
jury motivates the noncooperative equilibrium concept.
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by just one juror, or that it is distributed equitably among all jury members. If we had
a cost function C with non-decreasing returns to scale, as assumed in Section 5, then
there would be eﬃciency gains from assigning all cognitive costs to a single juror. Then,
again, the configuration s∗ that is optimal in the single-juror setup is an equilibrium in
the multi-juror case. We record these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose all jurors share identical functions V and C, the function C
has non-decreasing returns, and jurors can share eﬀortlessly the result of their evalua-
tion of evidence. Then if in the single-juror setup it is optimal to acquire a configuration
s∗, then s∗ is also a Nash equilibrium in the multi-juror case.
If the cost function had decreasing returns to scale, then it might be optimal to
distribute the eﬀort among jury members. In that case, a large jury might perform
better than a single-person jury because it would be able to allocate eﬀort more eﬃ-
ciently. If there was heterogeneity across jurors, then the analysis would have to be
adapted to deal with the problem of aggregating the disparate preferences of the jurors.
In such a setting the voting rules (simple majority, unanimity, etc.) will presumably
matter. Nevertheless, we expect the key results–that exclusion is a way of providing
the proper incentives for jurors to exert mental eﬀort, and that delegation to a judge
may be preferable to mandatory exclusion rules–to carry over to such environments.
6.2 Cognitive Capabilities of Jurors
Wemake three crucial assumptions that underlie our analysis of juror behavior: that ev-
idence must be processed in order to learn its informational content, that such process-
ing requires some cognitive cost, and that jurors can strategically select which pieces
of evidence they will process and which pieces they will not. We now discuss each
of these assumptions in order, and provide evidence to support that our specification
of juror behavior is consistent with research on learning, cognitive capabilities, and
decision-making.
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The first crucial assumption is that there is a distinction between a piece of evidence
and the fact that is trying to be established. For example, a piece of evidence might
be a footprint of a particular size and shape near the scene of the crime, and the fact
that is trying to be established is that the defendant was at the scene of the crime. The
footprint alone - prior to any consideration by a juror - cannot establish the defendant’s
presence at the scene. Instead, the juror must listen to the various arguments, compare
the footprint to the defendant’s footprint, and so forth in order to conclude whether
the defendant was, indeed, at the scene of the crime. This distinction between evidence
and fact is common in the legal literature; Loh (1985) speaks to this directly when he
states that “proof involves drawing inference from the evidence... [since] no conclusion
can be drawn from facts without some step of inductive inference.”
The second crucial assumption is that there is a cost associated with absorbing,
processing, and drawing an inference from a piece of evidence. Such costs have been
studied and verified at various stages of the learning and decision-making process.
At the first stage, attention is required to simply observe or listen to a new piece
of evidence. As Broadbent (1958) and Kahnemann (1973) document, such attention
requires eﬀort and the use of limited cognitive resources.23 At the second stage, both
time and eﬀort are required to transform new material into long-term memory that can
later be used in combination with other knowledge to draw inferences (see Craik and
Lockhart 1972 and Lindsay and Norman 1977).
At the last stage, reasoning itself requires cognitive strain. This is a widely accepted
fact in the literature on cognition and decision-making, though a universally accepted
metric of this strain remains elusive. There are various approaches to measuring cog-
nitive eﬀort (see O’Donnell and Eggemeier 1986). One approach is to simply ask the
subjects in an experiment to rate their own expended eﬀort. A basic finding is that
23Further documentation and discussion of limited cognitive resources can be found in Moray (1967),
Norman and Bobrow (1975), and Navon and Gopher (1979, 1980). Experiments by Wickens and Kramer
(1985) and Pashler (1988) lend additional support to our assumptions on the mind’s limitations; they
find considerable interference when subjects are asked to perform two tasks simultaneously.
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individuals consistently rate tasks that require more elaborate and precise tactics as
more costly in terms of eﬀort (Payne et al. 1993). Another approach is to give a second
task to subjects, and observe how much this task interferes with the original reasoning
task. Reasoning tasks or methods that are considered harder are indeed commonly
found to be subject to more interference by a second task. Third, researchers can
observe the physiological eﬀects of working through reasoning tasks of diﬀerent levels
of diﬃculty. They have found that cognitive strain can be measured physiologically,
documenting increases in heart rate, blood pressure, and glucose metabolism much like
physical exertion.24 Bettman et al. (1990) review previous attempts at measuring cog-
nitive strain, and propose a universal metric by establishing a relationship between the
amount of eﬀort expended on certain tasks and the number of “elementary information
processes”25 they require. They find that the total portfolio of elementary information
processes is indeed a good predictor of the time needed to solve a problem and of the
self-reported cognitive eﬀort.
These studies provide clear evidence of the cognitive limits on reasoning and the
eﬀort costs associated with it. Indeed, the limitations of the human mind and the cost
of cognitive processing are acknowledged in a wide range of psychological literatures,26
and even serve as maintained assumptions in many lines of research. For example, a
large body of work explores methods that ameliorate the strain of processing infor-
24Mulder and Mulder (1987), Aasman et al. (1987) and Backs and Seljos (1994) document the eﬀect
of reasoning on pulse, heart rate variability, and blood pressure, respectively. Jonides et al. (1997),
Fibiger et al. (1986) and Lund-Anderson (1979) document the eﬀect of cognitive strain on glucose
metabolism. One key aspect of understanding cognitive strain is recognizing that reasoning requires
the use of working memory, which has limited capacity and involves significant exertion. See, for
example, Miller (1956), Miyaki and Shah (1999), and De Neys et al. (2005). On a more illustrative
level, Leedy and Dubeck (1971) find that master chess players lose a significant amount of energy and
body weight during matches.
25The approach of splitting cognitive processes up into elementary parts goes back at least to Newell
and Simon (1972). Examples of elementary information processes are: reads, additions, diﬀerences,
products, elimination, comparisons.
26See, for example, Operario and Fiske (1999) and Kruglanski and Orehek (2007) for the field of social
cognition, and Hastie (2001) and Mellers et al. (1998) for perspectives on judgement and decision-
making research.
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mation in order to extract the best cognitive performance.27 Typical questions are
concerned with the dependence of cognitive processes on the manner in which informa-
tion is presented, as well as the eﬀectiveness of additional tools, such as note-taking,
on cognitive performance. In sum, we conclude that there is ample support for the
assumption that processing evidence is costly.
Having established that evidence must be processed, and that such processing is
costly, our third and final crucial assumption is that the juror has a choice of whether
or not to incur these costs when presented with a piece of evidence. Treating the
juror as a strategic decision-maker in gathering costly information is the foundation of
research on the selection of decision strategies. In this literature, the trade-oﬀ between
cognitive eﬀort and accuracy is studied carefully.28 For example by changing the payoﬀs
associated with a correct answer, Payne et al. (1993) find that changes in the benefits
of accuracy lead to changes in the amount of cognitive eﬀort expended. They also
attempt to quantify the eﬀort expended and the accuracy attained and conclude that
“people exhibit intelligent, if not optimal, responses to changes in ... task and context
variables.” (p. 249) This adaptivity is evidence that decision makers have a choice with
regards to incurring a cognitive cost or not, and make this choice strategically. There
is also physiological evidence of conscious “executive control” over cognitive processes.
Baker et al. (1996) isolate those areas of the brain that choreograph these executive
decisions, noting that they become activated when people are weighing choices.
Again, the ability to decide on cognitive eﬀort is so widely accepted that it is
often taken as a premise in the cognitive sciences. In current research on information
processing, persuasion and social cognition, an almost paradigmatic metaphor for the
decision maker is that of a “motivated tactician,” who Fiske and Taylor (1993) describe
27The “engineering psychology” literature (e.g. Gopher and Kimchi (1989) and Wickens and Kramer
(1985)) focuses on the optimal presentation of information to human operators.
28Sometimes this is referred to as “cost-benefit theory” in the field of decision making. Early pa-
pers that consider this or similar trade-oﬀs are Yates and Kulick (1977), Beach and Mitchell (1978),
Christensen-Szalanski (1978, 1980), Payne (1982), Johnson and Payne (1985), Russo and Dosher (1983)
and Shugan (1980).
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as “a fully engaged thinker who has multiple cognitive strategies available and chooses
among them based on goals, motives, and needs.” (p. 13) According to Molden and
Higgens (2005), this “tactician” balances the benefits of reasoning - increased accuracy,
for one - with the costs of eﬀort.29 Empirical research has found that individuals
respond to raising the stakes of accuracy by expending more eﬀort to be accurate
(Kruglanski and Freund 1983, Freund et al. 1985), for example by considering more
alternatives and coming up with more complicated explanations (e.g. Tetlock and
Kim 1987). Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) found experimental evidence that pieces
of information continue to be processed until a desired level of accuracy is reached, a
policy they call the “suﬃciency principle”, which goes back to the notion of “satisficing”
by Simon (1955).
There is support for our assumptions in the jury literature as well. To a large extent,
this literature focuses more on practical issues, and less on empirical tests of the “best”
cognitive model of juror behavior.30 However, often while attacking more practical
issues, these authors find supporting evidence for our assumption that jurors trade oﬀ
the benefits of a more accurate verdict with cognitive costs. A number of examples
are mentioned below. Forsterlee et al. (1997) and Fosterlee et al. (2005) find that
note-taking encourages more complicated evidence and more complex arguments to be
considered by a jury, which points directly to the cognitive constraints the jury faces.
As stated above, Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) find that jurors process pieces of
information until the desired level of accuracy is reached, where this level is responsive
to the importance that the subject attaches to it. Weinstock and Flaton (2004) find
more support for the optimization under cognitive constraints: they document that
those jurors who are more certain of their verdict are less apt to process additional
information, while those that are less certain will likely utilize supplementary pieces
of evidence. Other indicative support comes from jury responses to changes in the
29See also an early overview by Kunda (1990).
30Some common practical issues in this literature are stereotyping, the impact of expert witnesses,
the use of jury instructions, and the impact of sentencing options. See Devine et al. (2000) for a survey.
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presentation of evidence. For example, Bourgeois et al., (1993) find that complex
evidence that is explained in non-technical terms is taken into account more often and
more thoroughly. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) find the same when evidence is presented
twice.
In sum, we have presented a model of learning and decision-making that is consistent
with the general literature in cognitive psychology, and more specifically consistent with
a variety of studies of juror behavior.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a formal model of an important principle of evidence in common-law
legal systems: exclusion by reason of undue prejudice. The key novelty of the model
is that the fact-finders (jurors) have a cognitive cost of processing evidence. We have
shown that this assumption is well grounded in the psychological literature.
Within this framework, the judge excludes evidence in order to incentivize the jury
to focus on other, more probative evidence. Exclusion is not, therefore, a countermea-
sure to irrational updating on the part of the jury; rather, it is a way to incentivize
jurors that are “cognitive misers.” We studied the comparative statics properties of
this model, and we have shown that some fairly intuitive properties do not always hold.
For example, making evidence more probative may lead it to be optimally excluded.
Similarly, a judge may optimally choose to exclude more evidence when faced with a
more competent jury. Finally, we have shown that the decision to exclude evidence is a
contextual one: optimal exclusion of one piece of evidence requires taking into account
its relationship with all other pieces of evidence. We interpret these counterintuitive
properties and complexities as evidence that general rules mandating exclusion are un-
likely to be optimal. In our model, optimal exclusion is achieved straightforwardly by
giving the judge broad exclusionary powers. This is, of course, the arrangement that
prevails in current procedure.
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We also provided suﬃcient conditions under which exclusion is not helpful. This
is the case when, roughly speaking, all the available evidence fits together tightly into
one coherent story (formally, when all pieces of evidence are complementary with each
other). This configuration of evidence is arguably more likely to arise in the inquisi-
torial systems typical of continental law, in which evidence-gathering is carried out by
one agent (typically, a judge). In adversarial systems, the evidence is gathered by two
opposing parties, and so it is unlikely to all fit together into a coherent story. Rather,
the evidence gathered by each party is likely to fit together into a coherent story, but
the two stories need not fit together with each other. In this case, we have shown
that it may be optimal to exclude some part of a story. We interpret this property
as consistent with the regularity that exclusion by reason of prejudice is found almost
exclusively in adversarial (common law) systems.
Beyond the specific contributions mentioned above, this paper can be seen in a
broader context. A broader contribution of this paper, in our view, is to introduce ev-
idence rules as a a new and potentially important area of application for the theory of
endogenous information acquisition. Information theorists have analyzed other aspects
of judicial decision-making as optimally designed schemes to incentivize information
acquisition. The rich area of evidence rules, however, has hitherto received little at-
tention. If, as we propose here, some rules of evidence can profitably be interpreted as
devices to induce more accurate decision-making by the fact finder, then a whole body
of rules potentially opens up for analysis.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Derivation of Values in Table 1
The entries in Table 1 are simple to calculate. For example, consider the expected
payoff to the juror from processing E1. First, the juror incurs processing cost −5.
With probability 15 the signal reveals that the driver’s speed was in the interval [0, 20],
and the juror can rule with certainty that the car was traveling at less than fifty miles
per hour. His payoff from this correct ruling is 0. On the other hand, with probability
4
5 the signal reveals that the driver’s speed was in the interval [20, 100]. Conditional on
this realization, the juror can deduce that the car was traveling less than fifty miles per
our with probability 38 and more than fifty miles per our with probability
5
8 . Therefore,
the juror’s expected payoff from ruling that x ≤ 50 is (38) (0) + (58) (−100), while the
expected payoff from ruling that x > 50 is
(
5
8
)
(0) +
(
3
8
)
(−100). Clearly, then, the
juror optimally rules that the car’s speed exceeded fifty miles per hour. The ex-ante
expected payoff from processing E1 is thus
−5 +
(
1
5
)
(1) (0) +
(
4
5
)(
3
8
)
(−100) = −35.
The payoff to society is the same, except that the processing costs are ignored. All
other entries are calculated in an identical fashion.
8.2 Extending the Simple Example
In this section, we generalize the simple example that has been employed throughout
the paper in order to further explain the intuition behind our results. To that end,
again let the decision and the payoffs of the juror, as well as the properties of x and
E2, remain as specified in Section 2. However, let E1, with cost c1 = 5, reveal whether
or not x lies in the region [0, ξ], for some value of ξ ∈ [0, 50]. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate
the expected payoffs to the juror and society, respectively, as the value of ξ varies from
0 to 50. Note than when ξ is small E1 has little informational content, and as ξ grows
33
it becomes more informative.31
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
When ξ ≤ 5, E1 is sufficiently uninformative that the juror will not incur the
processing costs. In this region, the juror chooses only to process E2, and an increase
in the informational content of E1 has no effect. When ξ ∈ [5, 15], the juror chooses to
process both E1 and E2, so that the first best is achieved. However, when ξ ∈ [15, 40],
the juror chooses to process only E1 and the payoff to society decreases. Finally, when
ξ ∈ [40, 50], E1 is the more informative signal. In this region, the juror processes only
E1, and the payoff to society is increasing in the informational content of E1. Consistent
with proposition 1, it is easy to see that an increase in the informational content of E1
can lead to either better or worse outcomes.
In Figure 4 below, we plot the expected payoff to society conditional on the opti-
mal exclusion policy being implemented. Notice first that E1 and E2 are complements
when ξ ≤ 10 and substitutes when ξ > 10. Therefore, E1 switches from a complement
to a substitute for E2 as it becomes more informative. Also notice that E1 is allowed
for all ξ ≤ 10, reflecting that complementarity is a sufficient condition for evidence to
be admitted, as summarized in proposition 5.2. However, that ξ ∈ [10, 15] ∪ [40, 50]
is also optimally allowed illustrates that complementarity is not a necessary condition
for evidence to be admitted, and indeed the usefulness of proposition 5.2 may be lim-
ited. Figure 4 further highlights the absence of general principles guiding exclusion
as it illustrates that the optimal decision rule of the judge is non-monotonic in the
informational content of the information system (as summarized in proposition 1), as
31Consider signal EB1 with corresponding value ξ
B and signal EA1 with corresponding value ξ
A, such
that ξB ≥ ξA. Strictly speaking, EB1 is not more informative than EA1 in the sense of Blackwell, since
EB1 is not necessarily more informative than signal E
A
1 for all decision problems. However, for this
decision problem EB1 is more informative than E
A
1 , and thus the example that follows is a perfectly
adequate mechanism to illustrate the effects of evidence becoming more informative.
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are the expected payoffs to society (as summarized in proposition 1).
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
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